Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship

1998

The Goals of Environmental Enforcement and the
Range of Enforcement Methods in Israel and in the
United States
Marcia R. Gelpe
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, marcia.gelpe@mitchellhamline.edu

Publication Information
14 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 135 (1998). Originally published in Symposium: New
Approaches to Safeguard Mankind's Ecological Future
Repository Citation
Gelpe, Marcia R., "The Goals of Environmental Enforcement and the Range of Enforcement Methods in Israel and in the United
States" (1998). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 174.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/174

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.

The Goals of Environmental Enforcement and the Range of Enforcement
Methods in Israel and in the United States
Abstract

The article examines enforcement of the environmental laws of Israel and of the United States. It concentrates
on provisions for enforcement of the laws by government authorities--that is, either by administrative
authorities or by the courts at the request of an administrative authority. Environmental laws in many
jurisdictions may also be enforced by private actions. These private enforcement actions are not addressed
specifically in this article, although much of what is said is also applicable to such actions.
Keywords

environmental law, comparative legal studies, Israeli environmental law, environmental enforcement,
administrative law, private law enforcement
Disciplines

Administrative Law | Environmental Law

This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/174

THE GOALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT AND THE RANGE OF
ENFORCEMENT METHODS IN ISRAEL AND IN
THE UNITED STATES
MARCIA GELPE*

I. Introduction
Many different types of enforcement actions may be taken against those
who violate environmental laws. This article describes a variety of methods
of enforcing environmental laws, evaluates each one, and recommends
changes in the enforcement provisions of Israeli environmental laws.
The article examines enforcement of the environmental laws of Israel and
of the United States. It concentrates on provisions for enforcement of the
laws by government authorities - that is, either by administrative authorities
or by the courts at the request of an administrative authority. Environmental
laws in many jurisdictions may also be enforced by private actions.! These
private enforcement actions are not addressed specifically in this article,
although much of what is said is also applicable to such actions. Also beyond
the scope of this article are permits and other arrangements for implementa-

*

Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, S1. Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A.; Professor,

Netanya Academic College, Netanya, Israel.
See,jor example, in Israel, Water Law § 20Y (1959),1993 Isc Bovt!' Legis.

D~2, D~14;

Prevention of Environmental Nuisances (Actions by Citizens) Law (1992), 1993 Isr.
Eovt!. Legis. B~I3. In the United States, see Clean Air Act § 304, 42 V.S.C.A. § 7604
(West 1995); Clean Water Ac! § 50S. 33 V.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West 1995); Toxic
Substances Control Act, IS V.S.C.A. § 2619 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997). The fact that
many environmental laws arc enforceable by private action blurs the distinction between

private civil-punitive law and public civil-punitive law, as noted by Professor Mann. K.
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions, 16 Tel Aviv U. L. Rev. 243 (1991) (Hebrew). In fact, in
Israel, where private parties may seek criminal sanctions under a number of laws, the
entire criminal-civil distinction is somewhat blurred.
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tion of the requirements of environmental laws. Although permits could be
considered part of the enforcement system insofar as they are used to achieve
compliance, they are not covered here. This article deals with enforcement
only in the sense of actions taken against parties who have violated the
requirements of environmental laws. Permits, on the other hand, affect
compliance mainly by preventing violations before they occur.
Finally, this article does not consider compensatory remedies, even though
they may have the effect of a means of enforcement. If a person who violates
environmental laws must pay compensation for personal, property, and
natural resource injuries, some of the effects upon the behavior of that
person may be similar to those of penalties, particularly civil and administrative penalties. This article addresses only more direct means of enforcement.
The nature of the requirements of the law is not relevant for the purposes
of this article. It is of no consequence whether the law requires 0 bservance of
a certain emission standard, or payment of an effluent charge, or reporting
of a discharge. Nor does it matter whether the requirement is in a statute, a
regulation, a permit, or in another document given legal force by the
applicable law. In all cases, if a party violates a legal requirement, the
question arises as to what is to be done about the violator - which method
of enforcement should be used.
II. Evaluating Methods of Enforcement
Each method of enforcing environmental laws is evaluated based on the
criteria of efficacy, workability, substantive fairness, and procedural fairness.
"Efficacy" refers to how successful a particular enforcement action is in
reaching its goal. For example, one goal of enforcement is to deter future
violations by third parties. Enforcement by some means, such as a criminal
fine, is efficacious if it actually deters others from violating the law.
Workability refers to whether the enforcement method will be used by the
government authority that is responsible for enforcing the law. An enforcement method is not workable if there is some practical barrier, such as high
administrative costs, to its utilization.
Substantive fairness relates to whether there is a fair proportionality
between the severity of the sanction imposed and the seriousness of the
violation. Procedural fairness addresses the issue of whether the procedures
used for imposing the sanction give sufficient protection to the alleged
violator.
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Each one of the last three standards of evaluation is fairly clear in itself.
The first, efficacy, requires further elaboration.
III. Efficacy and the Goals of Environmental Enforcement

I. Goals of Environmental Laws
In order to identify the goals of environmental enforcement, it is necessary
first to identify the general goals of the environmental laws themselves.
Commentators describe two views of environmental laws.2 One view is
that they proscribe pollution because it is inherently bad: it is harmful to
health and to society. Violation of the laws is deemed immoral behavior.'
Under this view, those who violate environmental legal norms are just like
any other criminal.
The second view posits that environmental laws limit activity that would
not occur if the market worked properly in regard to polluting activities.
Market defects lead polluters to engage in activities that cause harm to the
environment. As the extensive literature shows, we overuse the air, water,
and land as waste dumps because we do not have to pay the full cost of using
these common resources.' Environmental laws provide a substitute for the
payments the market would demand if it set a price for use of common
resources. While the substitute set in the laws could be in the form of a charge
for use of these resources, it is most commonly a standard that limits the
amonnt of permissible discharges. The source must then meet the standard
instead of paying the cost of using the resource. Under this view, the law does
not define or proscribe activity that is immoral, but, rather, only tries to
assure the allocation of resources that would be achieved in a well-functioning
market. If this is achieved, the properlevel of environmental protection will
be provided.
2 See Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law Penalties: Civil Remedies,
Alternatives, Policy, and Conslilutionallmplications, 45 Ad, L. Rev. 367, 371-72 (L.J.
Kerrigan ed., 1993) (hereinafter Decriminalization). 1.1. Charney, The Need/or Consti*
tutional Proteclionsjor Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 478, 496
(1974).
.
3 See Charney, supra note 2, at 496.
4 The discharger does not have to pay the full cost because of the common nature of the
resource into which the discharge is made (see, e.g., Garrett Hardin's classic essay, The
Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 Sci. J243 (1968)), because of the lack of information on the
effects of the discharge, and because of the inadequacy of the tort system as a means of
forcing the discharger to internalize the costs that the discharge imposes on others.
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It is not necessary to debate here which of these two goals, definition of
bad behavior or correction of a market defect, is most essential to environmental regulation. Clearly both are goals of the environmental laws currently
in force.

2. Goals of Environmental Enforcement
How we define the purpose of environmental law influences how we view
enforcement of these laws. To the extent that we define the objective as
setting out unacceptable norms of behavior, the goals of enforcement are the
traditional goals of criminal punishment: retribution - "the deserved infliction of suffering on evildoers";' specific deterrence -.- deterring the violator
from repeating the violation; general deterrence - deterring others from
violating the legal norm; incapacitation; and rehabilitation. 6
Some comments on general deterrence in environmental law would be
helpful in understanding concepts presented below. The theory of general
deterrence posits that a sanction imposed on one person deters another from
violating because the second person takes into account the possibility that
the sanction will be imposed on him before he commits the violation. If the
sanction appears serious enough, the second person will be dissuaded from
committing the violation.
This theory assumes that the potential violator considers the possible
sanction before committing the violation. This assumption is probably valid
for a great many violations of the environmental laws, which are designed to
control the behavior of organizations (corporations or governmental units).
These laws address planned activity, not impulsive actions.'
Some environmental laws, such as laws against littering, do address
individual, more impulsive activity. For these laws, Packer's theory of the
second way in which general deterrence functions is more apt. Packer tells us
that the calculated consideration of sanction is less important than the role
5 H.L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 36 (\968).
6 [d., at 35-61.
7 As Packer points out, this is a very rationalist model of how general deterrence works and
has been rejected or modified by fome, Packer, supra note 5, at 40-45. The rationalist
model is probably morc applicable to environmental laws that govern behavior of
organizations (corporations and governments) than it is to traditional criminal laws. On
the other hand, the rationalist model is probably less valid for some environmental
violations, especially those committed by individuals, such as littering. In the latter type
of cases, Packer's observation that general deterrence may work by creating general
societal norms of behavior is more relevant. Packer, supra note 5, at 43-45.
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of the law in creating general societal norms of behavior that will influence
the actor in more subtle ways. 8
In either case, the degree of deterrence also depends on the size of the
sanction and the probability that it will be imposed. If the probability of
imposition of the sanction increases, the same deterrent effect can be achieved
through a smaller sanction, so long as the sanction remains greater than the
gain to be had from the violation. The reverse is also true: if the size of the
sanction shrinks, it will still have a deterrent effect if the probability of
imposition ofthe sanction increases (again, with the proviso that the sanction
exceed the gain from the violation). This relationship is fortunate because
there becomes reason to believe that as the size of the sanction decreases, it is
easier to impose the sanction, and the probability that it will be imposed can

rise.
It is easier to impose smaller sanctions for two reasons. Courts and other
actors are probably less reluctant to impose relatively smaller sanctions. In
addition, we can expect that if the sanction is not very large, the subject of
the sanction will be less likely to fight against its imposition. On the other
hand, administrative agencies may be somewhat reluctant to try to impose
small sanctions if the procedures for doing so are burdensome, because the
payoff is not perceived as high enough to justify the effort. This suggests that
general deterrence is best achieved by relatively small sanctions imposed
through relatively simple procedures.
Both the size of the sanction as well as the probability of its imposition
should be considered from the point of view of the potential polluter. Even if
the sanction is large and there is a high likelihood that it will be imposed, it
will have no general deterrent effect if the potential polluter is not aware of
the sanction. In other words, to achieve the effect of general deterrence,
those who might violate the law must be aware of the size ofthe sanction and
the likelihood of its imposition. Awareness is probably created where the
chance of the sanction being imposed is high. Word gets around. On the
other hand, special publicity, such as through news items, will occur only in
cases in which the sanction is large enough to attract media attention.
Turning to the second view of the goals of environmental law, we see that
to the extent that the aim is to create a proper allocation of resources,
specific and general deterrence are primary goals of enforcement. An additional goal is recapture of ill-gotten gains. Recapture is important, in part
8 Packer, supra note 5, at 43-45.
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because it contributes to general deterrence. Recapture of ill-gotten gains
shows potential violators that they will not be better off due to the violation.
Recapture is even more important for a distinct reason: the need to
remove the competitive advantage received by the violator. This is essential
for ensuring that the person who voluntarily complies with the law will not
be put at a competitive disadvantage as compared to the violator. In part, we
want to do this in order to deter the potential competitor from also violating
the law in order to maintain his market po;ition. Put another way, we always
want to encourage voluntary compliance with the law. Compliance with
environmental laws is usually costly. Therefore, in order to encourage
compliance, we must try not to create a situation where the person who
complies voluntarily is worse off because he bears a cost that his noncomplying competitor avoids. Furthermore, it distorts the market to allow a
pollution source to keep the savings it has amassed by violating the law.
Another auxiliary goal under either view of enforcement may be to restore
the environment to the condition it would ·have been in had the law been
observed. Whether pollution is the result of immoral behavior or a market
dislocation, it has adverse effects, and to the extent that its impact persists, it
should be reversed. This may be done by cleaning up the pollution, restoring
polluted resources to their unpolluted state, or by providing alternative
resources to replace the unremediable effects of pollution.
IV. Enforcement Methods: Description, Evaluation, and Prescription
This Section describes the various methods employed to enforce Israeli
and American environmental laws, evaluates each method, and suggests the
circumstances under which each is appropriate for enforcement.

1. Major Criminal Sanctions
a) Description
Both Israeli and American environmental statutes generally provide criminal sanctions (fines and imprisonment) for violations.' Some Israeli environmentallaws specify explicitly that strict liability applies. 10 In these cases,
9 E.g., Clean Air Act § I 13(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c) (West 1995) (West 1986 & Supp.
1997); Clean Water Act § 309(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d), (e) (West 1995).
10 E.g., Cleanliness Law 13(1) (as added by Environmental Quality Law (Methods of
Punishment) (Amendment of Statutes) ch. 2, § 2(6) (1997)) (Isr.).
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liability is subject to two limitations: (I) only a fine may be imposed unless at
least negligence is proven, 11 and (2) if the accused can prove that his state of
mind constituted neither intent, recklessness, nor negligence and that he did
all that he could to prevent the violation, he is not liable." Other laws have
no explicit statement as to scienter,l3 and in such cases, it is necessary to
show at least recklessness. 14 American laws impose criminal liability only for
knowing, or, occasionally, negligent, violations." The laws of both countries
impose personal criminal liability on corporate officers, managers, and
responsible employees for many violations by a business entity." In Israel,
this personal liability is almost absolute, with very limited defenses available
to the individual. 17
II Penal Law § 22(c)(1977)(lsr.). The citation is to section I of amendment 39 to the Penal
Law (1994 Seier HaHukim [S.H.] 1481), This section adds four new sections to the
original law; the new sections will be sections 19-22 of the Penal Law.
12 Penal Law § 22(b). This limitation does not apply in all cases.
13 E.g., Water Law § 20U (1959), 19931sr. Envt!. Legis. 0-2, 0-12.
14 Penal Law §§ 19,20. If a law is silent as to the requirement of scienter, but, prior to the
effective date of the 1994 amendment to the Penal Law, had been interpreted by a court as
establishing astrict liability offense, then it is a strict liability offense, Penal Law § 22(a).
15 Clean Air Act § 113(c)(I)-(3), (5); Clean Water Act § 309(c)(2)-(4); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act § 3008(d), (e), 42 U.S.CA. § 6928(d), (e) (West 1995); all these acts
specify that the offense must have been done "knowingly," Courts sometimes read
narrowly the requirement that the violation be knowing. For example, in United States v.
Hayes Int'I Corp., 786 F.29 1499 (lIth Cir. 1986), the court held that the defendant could
be held liable for knowingly transporting hazardous waste to a facility lacking a permit.
The defendant did not have to know that the material shipped was hazardous or that a
permit was required. It was enough that the defendant knew the identity of the material
and knew that the facility did not have a permit. The court held that in a heavily·regulated
industry with significant public health and safety effects, it is reasonable to charge those
who operate with knowledge ofthe regulatory provisions. Criminal penalties for negligent
violations are provided in Clean Air Act § II3(c)(4); Clean Water Act § 309(c)(I). The
Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §407 (West 1986&Supp. 1997), is an exception among United
States statutes. It sets a criminal penalty for violations without requiring scienter. This
was held permissible in United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (Ist Cir. 1974).
16 The formulation of who is responsible varies from law to law. In the Israeli laws, compare
Abatement of Nuisances Law § 14, IS L.S.1. 52, 54 (1960-1961) (liability imposed on a
person who controlled or supervised a person or place where the violation occurred) with
Water Law § 20Y (liability imposed on active managers, partners [other than limited
partners] and officers responsible for the matter). In United States law, compare Clean
Air Act § 113(c)(6) (responsible corporate officer is liable) and Clean Water Act §
309(c)(6) (same) with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U,S,C.A. § 6928
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (parallel section on enforcement with no comparable
provision).
17 See, e.g., Water Law § 20Y (to avoid individual responsibility, the person must "prove
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The severity of the criminal sanction varies considerably between the two
countries and, to a lesser extent, among various statutes within each country.
Criminal fines are much higher in the United States. The Israeli Water Law,
for example, provides criminal fines ofNIS 268,000 (currently about $77,000)
or a year's imprisonment for each violation." The structure of the law
suggests that this amount probably is not to be imposed for each day that the
violation continues, at least where the violating activity is ongoing. 19 The law
also imposes a fine of NIS 17,800 (about $5,100) or imprisonment for seven
days per day for an offense that continues after an official warning. 20 In
comparison, the American Clean Water Act provides criminalfines of up to
$25,000 per day of violation and imprisonment for a year for negligent
violations and fines of $50,000 per day and three years for knowing violations. 2l Whether or not a warning has been given is irrelevant. Fines well in
excess of $1 million have been imposed. 22 Furthermore, the fines under the
Israeli Water Law are among the highest provided in all of Israeli environmental law. While the fines for violating several other laws were recently
brought into line with those imposed by the Water Law," other laws still set
lower penalty amounts. For example, the fines in the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea from Land-Based Sources Law are NIS 50,000 ($14,000) or one

18
19

20
21

22

23

that the offense was committed without his knowledge and that he took all reasonable
measure to prevent or stop the offense"). A recent amendment to the Penal Law may
ameliorate the apparent severity of such provisions. Penal Law §§ 18, 19.
Water Law § 20U.
The Law expressly sets a fine per day for violations that continue after a warning, but
only sets one fine for a violation up to the time of warning; Water Law § 20U. This
probably should be read to set a fine for the violation as a whole prior to the time of
warning.
Water Law § 20U.
Clean Water Act § 309(c)(I) (addressing negligent violations); § 309(c)(2) (addressing
knowing violations). Under both subsections, the maximum punishment is doubled for
violations after the first conviction. In addition, a special provision on crimes inVOlving
"knowing endangerment" (knowingly placing a person "in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury") provides a penalty of up to $250,000 and fiftee,n years imprisonment for an individual and of up to $1 million for an organization. Again, penalties are
double for violations after a conviction.
See Environmental Crimes & Enforcement Committee, 1996 Ann. Rep., 1996 Nat.
Resources, Energy, & Envt!. L., The Year in Review 152, 155-56 (describing cases
imposing criminal fines of $1 million, $3 million, $22 million, and $75 million under
various environmental statutes).
Environmental Quality Law (Methods of Punishment) (Amendments to Statutes).
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year's imprisonment per violation, with an additional NIS 1,000 ($300) per
day imposed for an offense that continues after conviction."
In practice, Israeli courts that impose criminal fines tend to impose a fine
that is lower than the maximum allowed by law, adding a higher fine that is
to be paid only if the violator does not meet conditions specified in the court
order, such as a requirement to desist further pollution."
Israeli law has several features that are not found in its American counterpart. Many Israeli environmental laws provide that criminal penalties be
paid into a special fund, rather than into the State treasury." Such a
provision does not exist in American law. In Israel, but not in the United
States, private persons may initiate actions for criminal sanctions under

most environmentallaws. 27 Israeli criminal law includes a general provision
that allows a court in a criminal proceeding to issue an order 'requiring a
person convicted of a crime to pay damages for injury or suffering." The
effectiveness of this provision is limited because the maximum amount of the
payment is NIS 84,400 ($24,000), which is not likely to be full compensation
in many environmental cases. In addition, several environmental statutes

provide that the court order in a criminal proceeding may include an order
that the guilty party repay costs of correcting the environmental damage
caused by the violation to whomever took corrective action and then sought
repayment as part of the proceeding." One statute allows the court to cancel
a license issued under the law that the defendant was guilty of violating. 3D

24 Prevention ofPoJlution from Land-Based Sources Law § 6(a) (1988), 1993 Isr. BuvtL
Legis. E·20, E·22.
25 See Ministry of the Environment, Legal Bureau, Court Decisions 1994-1997 (Feb. 24,
1997) (Hebrew).
26 E.g., Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 32 (1980),
1993 lsI'. Envtl. Legis. B-2, B-8; Maintenance of Cleanliness Law §§ 10, 13(b), 38 L.S.L
190, 192, 194 (1983-1984) (except that fines assessed by special local courts are paid into
the treasury of the local authority, such as the municipality).
27 E.g., Water Law § 20Y; Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) § 68, app. 2, 36
L.S.I. 35,49,79 (1981-1982), amended by Prevention of Sea Pollution from Land~Based
Sources Law § 15 (1988), 1993 ISL EnvtL Legis. E~20, E-24.
28 Penal Law § 77(a).
29 E.g., Cleanliness Law § toe (as added by Environmental Quality Law [Methods of
Punishment] [Amendments to Statutes] § 3[8]); Water Law § 20 (24)(1).
30 Dangerous Substances Law § 15a(5) (as added by Environmental Quality Law [Methods
of Punishment] [Amendments to Statutes] § 5[5]).
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b) Evaluation - Efficacy
Criminal sanctions inflict retribution only if the sanctions are actually
imposed. This requires that the relevant actors in various parts of the
criminaljustice system agree that retribution for violation of environmental
laws is appropriate. If there is no such consensus, the complex machinery
needed to impose a criminal sanction will not operate. Prosecutors will not
prosecute and judges will not convict.
Nonetheless, the criminal sanction is perhaps the main enforcement
mechanism used in Israel.
In the United States, by contrast, despite the fact that almost all laws
provide criminal sanctions, such sanctions are imposed primarily for violations of rules for handling wastes" or for very serious violations of other
laws. 3' In these cases, retribution is probably seen as a particularly fitting
goal. Wastes denominated as "hazardous" are generally seen as especially
dangerous to public health, so their mishandling is much like traditional
criminal activity that endangers persons. Overall, criminal sanctions are not
used frequently in the United States, although its use is on the rise. 3)
It is not clear how well criminal fines work as a general deterrent. The
usual objection to imposing any monetary fine, penalty, or other assessment
for violation of an environmental law is that the violator can simply consider
the assessment as one of the costs of doing business and pass the cost through
to the consumer .34 If the fines are high enough to make it difficult to pass
them through and are imposed frequently enough, they will have a general
deterrent effect. Their efficacy in this way does not depend, however, on
their criminal nature. The fact that criminal sanctions are procedurally
31 Compare 1 W. Rodgers, Environmental Law § 3.38 (1986) (reporting little criminal
enforcement of the Clean Air Act) and 2 W. Rodgers, Environmental Law § 4.40 (1986)
(reporting little criminal enforcement of the Clean Water Act) with 4 W. Rodgers,
Environmental Law § 7.23 (1992) (reporting more common criminal enforcement of the
provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act which regulate hazardous
waste). There has been serious consideration of broader use of criminal sanctions in the
U.S., although some question the efficacy of such sanctions. See Decriminalization,
supra note 2, at 379~84.
32 See cases cited in Environmental Crimes & Enforcement Committee, supra note 22, at
155-56.
33 See Environmental Crimes & Enforcement Committee, supra note 22, at 155~56; S.
Bellew & D. Surtz, Comment, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A
Corporate Guide fO Avoiding Liability, 8 ViiI. Envtl. LJ. 205,235 n. 172 (1997).
34 For regulated industries, this requires that the violator include the assessment as part of
the rate base.
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difficult to impose almost certainly impacts the frequency of imposition and
decreases their efficacy for general deterrence.
In theory, incarceration should be a strong general deterrent to violating
environmental statutes. Incarceration is one sanction that can not be passed
through to the consumer. Yet criminal incarceration will serve as a general
deterrent only if it is imposed with high enough frequency to convince
potential violators not to take the risk. Because incarceration appears as a
very harsh sanction for environmental violations, it may be difficult to have
it imposed with sufficient frequency.
In the United States, over the course ofthe five years dating from 1991 to
1995, between twenty-two and sixty-nine years of incarceration were imposed
each year in all the criminal actions for environmental violations brought in
the country." This was enough to warrant a great deal of attention in the
literature," but it is not clear what the rate of incarceration was (what
percentage of violators spent time in prison) or whether this represents
enough of a threat to change substantially the behavior of those corporate
officials who would not otherwise follow the law. In Israel, which has a low
record of criminal incarceration for violation of the environmentallaws,37
the threat of such incarceration may have some effect, but it is hard to
measure.
The same questions arise regarding the efficacy of the criminal sanction
for specific deterrence.
Criminal fines that are suspended on the condition that the violator meet
specific requirements set out in a court order or not repeat the violation, can
work well for promoting the goal of specific deterrence. Nonetheless, they
cut against general deterrence. If most of the fine is suspended, much of the
general deterrent effect is lost. A source can then violate, wait to be caught,
pay a small fine, and thereby avoid the larger fine by belatedly coming into
compliance.
Criminal sanctions are not well-suited to recovering the savings of non-

compliance, since that savings is not necessarily taken into account in fixing
. the penalty amount.
Israeli criminal orders require clean-up help to restore the damaged
35 Bellew & Surtz, supra note 33. This figure excludes suspended portions of prison
sentences.
36 E.g., M. Herz, Structures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 Fordham Envtl.
L.J. 679 (1996).
37 See Ministry of the Environment, supra note 25.
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environment, although this is a problematic method for obtaining the civil
remedy of restoration. Because the orders are issued only against those
convicted for environmental crimes, increased standards of proof and other
complications of criminal proceedings apply. Such remedies should not be
seen as an effective way of obtaining environmental clean-up. Rather, they
serve as a nice addendum to the criminal sanction when it is otherwise
imposed.
Criminal sanctions may help to restore the damaged environment in a
different way under those Israeli statutes that provide for the payment of
criminal fines into a special fund. This fund can be used for environmental
restoration. 38 The use of special funds for criminal fines may be criticized as
encouraging "overzealous" enforcement. The argument is that if administrative authorities believe that their own programs will benefit from increased
funding from the collection of criminal fines, they will be excessively eager to
identify violations and to bring criminal enforcement actions. This argument
is not convincing. First, it would apply only for substantial violations where
the size of the probable fine makes the enforcement action worthwhile. In
regard to such violations, vigorous enforcement is appropriate and not
"overzealous." Second, the argument about enforcement incentives works
both ways. The fact that in the absence of special funds, the agencies
responsible for enforcing the laws must spend time and money to do so,
without seeing any programmatic benefit, may be a disincentive to reasonably aggressive enforcement. Therefore, the special fund only removes the
disincentive. It does not "overcorrect," because it still does not give agency
personnel anything except indirect rewards (recognition, increased budgets)
for enforcement.
c) Workability
Criminal sanctions have a low degree of workability for a number of
reasons. The costs to the enforcing agency of imposing such sanctions are
high. The need to involve authorities not well-versed in environmental law
and more accustomed to pursuing more traditional criminals or else with

Sea~Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 14
(1980), 1993 Isr. Envtl. Legis. E-2, E-3; Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § to. The
number of statutes under which criminal penalties are paid into special environmental
funds was recently expanded. Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment]
[Amendments to Statutes).

38 See, e.g., Prevention of
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differing political agendas can pose a real barrier to criminal enforcement."
Similarly, it is difficult to get a court to impose a criminal sanction, due to
both heightened requirements of proof as well as to the view of some judges
that a criminal penalty is not appropriate for a "mere" environmental
violation. This latter problem is certainly more pronounced in Israel, where
awareness of environmental matters is still in its embryonic stage in comparison to the United States.
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness
It may be claimed that criminal sanctions generally are substantively fair,
if only because both the protections for defendants in the criminal justice
system as well as the hesitancy to recognize environmental violations as
crimes prevent imposition of such sanctions for any except the most egregious
of environmental offenses. Still, as with other administrative offenses, the
question may be raised as to whether it is fundamentally fair to label the
violator a criminal. The answer depends in part on how the objective of
environmental law is defined. If environmental law is seen as proscribing
immoral behavior, then the label is deserved; but as discussed above, not
everyone agrees with this rationale for environmental laws. Furthermore, in
many cases it is difficult to prove a connection between the outlawed activity
and any real harm to the health or other interests of the community.
Therefore, the deservedness ofthe criminal label is questionable, particularly
for minor violations of technical requirements. 40
Strong procedural protections are provided to an alleged violator before
imposition of major criminal sanctions.

39 See Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 429-30 (describing friction between the U,S.

Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Justice in criminal
prosecutions of violators of environmental laws); I. Zamir, The Administrative Offences
Law: An Introductory Note, 21 lsr. L. Rev. 201, 202-03 (1986).
40 See Zamir, supra note 39. Zamir questions whether this Jack of a clear relationship
between violation and sanction will generate disrespect for the law. Professor Kenneth
Mann raises another concern; he says that in cases where only the criminal sanction is
available, concerns that the criminal sanction is too harsh will lead authorities to hesitate
to impose any sanction at all on violators deserving of some sanction. Furthermore, if the
criminal sanction is employed, its use will be unfair, since it will be imposed only on a
small number of violators, while other violators will escape any sanction. Mann, supra
note I, at 243-44.
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e) Summary
While major criminal sanctions may serve several enforcement goals,
many of these goals are better served by other types of sanctions, to be
discussed below. Moreover, there are significant drawbacks to the criminal
sanction. Therefore, major criminal sanctions should be reserved for those
cases where these drawbacks are minimized, that is, for violations that are
regarded as sufficiently "bad" for prosecutors to prosecute, for judges to
impose criminal sanctions, and for the community to see imposition of the
sanction as fair. This will also solve some of the workability problems
insofar as it will free the mechanism of the criminal process from dealing
with all but the most egregious of violations.

2. Minor Criminal Fines
a) Description
Several Israeli laws set up a special mechanism for imposing small criminal
fines. For example, the law on marine pollution by oil provides that when a
summons for a criminal proceeding is issued, the authority issuing the
summons may offer the recipient of the summons the option of paying a
stated fine instead of being subject to a criminal trial. 41 Under this statute,
the amount of the fine is set by regulations. 42 If a person pays the fine, it is to
be considered a determination of guilt in a criminal proceeding.43 The
amounts of the fine are smaller than the amounts a court could impose in a
criminal proceeding, with the maximum fine for a first offense set at NIS
6,250 (about $1 ,800), as compared with the NIS 37,500 ($10,800) maximum
for court-imposed fines."
A general law on criminal procedure sets up a similar system for imposing
minor fines for violations of the laws on air pollution and on maintenance of
cleanliness.45 While the small criminal fines used to be quite low, recent
amendments provide for fines in an amount of up to ten percent of the fines
41 Prevention of Sea- Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 24 (1980),1993 Isr.
Envtl. Legis. E-2, E-6.
42 Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 25(a),
43 Prevention of Sea-Water Pollut:o.n by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 26.
44 Compare Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 25(b)
(on fines by summons) with § 18(a) (on court-imposed fines). The maximum fine by
summons for a repeat offense is NIS 12,500 ($3,700).
45 Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version); Order On Finable Offenses (Air Pollution), 3659 Kovetz Takanot [K.T.] 837 (1977); Order on Finable Offenses (Maintenance
of Cleanliness), 4751 K. T. 546 (1985).
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that a court could impose. For example, the maximum fine by summons
under the Maintenance of Cleanliness Law used to be NIS 490 ($140), but it
is now either NIS 4,980 ($1,400) or NIS 15,000 ($4,300), depending on the
violation. 46 Similar fines are provided under the laws on air pollution and
public health (which covers a variety of environmental nuisances), and
higher fines can be imposed under the law on dangerous substances. 47
Furthermore, higher fines are provided for violations by organizations, for
continuing violations, and for repeated violations. 48

As described above, some Israeli statutes establish special funds that can
be used for cleaning up pollution caused in violation of these statutes and for
other uses related to the statutory purpose. Minor criminal fines assessed
under these statutes are also paid into the special funds and not into the
national treasury.49
b) Evaluation - Efficacy
It is questionable whether small criminal fines, as they have been employed
in Israel, are an effective general deterrent. In the past, these fines were quite
low, and it is not clear whether they were sufficient to affect behavior. On the
other hand, the ease with which such fines can be imposed suggests that they
could be used with sufficient frequency to have some general deterrent effect.
As the amount of the fines grows, the deterrent effect may become stronger.
However, if the amount seems too large, the alleged violator will have an
incentive to fight its imposition, which will prevent the frequent application
necessary for achieving general deterrence. If the amount is small, the fines
can be easily imposed, but they do not deter violations that save significant
sums of money for the violating source.
It is in their capacity as special deterrents that small criminal fines are
most important. In this regard, they are probably highly effective with
respect to minor violations, since they play an important educational role.

46 Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § 13(a) (as added by Environmental Quality Law
[Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] § 2[7]); Abatement of Nuisances
Law § lied) (as added by Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [A~
mendment of Statutes] § 3[10]).
47 Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] chs. 3,
5,6 (air pollution, dangerous substances, and public health, respectively).
48 Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] chs. 2,
3,5,6.
49 E.g., Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 32.
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An individual who is subjected to a fine for a violation such as littering is
probably less likely to repeat the violation.
If the small fines are paid into a special fund, they may be used to clean up
pollution and restore polluted areas.
c) Workability
The greatest advantage of small criminal penalties is related to their
meausre of workability: as long as the violator does not request a full court
hearing, the fines are easily imposed. This advantage may decrease as the
amounts of the fines sought increase.
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness
In at least some cases, small criminal fines may seem to present a problem
with regard to substantive fairness. Since the amounts of the fines, even after
the recent increases, are relatively small, they are most likely designed to be
used in cases of minor infractions. Yet it is'exactly for such minor offenses
that it seems inappropriate to attach a criminal stigma. On the other hand, it
may be cljlimed that environmental violations, even minor ones, harm the
entire community and warrant the criminal sanction. Furthermore, when
the fines are imposed for actions such as polluting the ocean with oil from
ships, the argument against the fairness of a criminal sanction is less
persuasive.
Since the issue of substantive fairness is not clear-cut, it seems logical to
ask whether there is a genuine need to attach the criminal label to such fines.
!fthe purpose of the sanction is to deter violations by making them costly, it
seems that this end would be served just as well if the fines were civil in
nature. This also would be true if the purpose were educational.
Small criminal fines present no procedural fairness problem. An alleged
violator can choose to stand trial in a full criminal proceeding. 50 In the trial,
he will receive all the protections granted in criminal proceedings.

3. Civil Compliance Orders
a) Description
Israeli environmental law differs mostly from the American law in the
scope of the authority that is granted to the courts to impose civil remedies.
American statutes provide courts with extensive authority to impose civil
50 E.g., Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) §§ 24, 27.
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remedies on those who violate environmental laws. These remedies are
imposed in civil proceedings, at the behest of the government. These civil
proceedings are not public nuisance actions, but special statutory proceedings
designed to enforce the environmental laws with special statutorily provided

remedies.
For example, under both the Clean Air Act Sl and the Clean Water Act,"
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter
"EPA") may bring an action for injunctive relief against alleged violators.
Injunctive relief may include orders to cease violations or orders to take
specific steps to cease the violation.
American courts, at times, have used their civil remedy authority to
fashion rather creative remedies. Courts have imposed receiverships on
pu blic facilities not complying with environmental laws, directing the receiver
to bring the facility into compliance. 53 Other courts have appointed administrators with a different set of formal powers, but essentially with the same
obligation to ensure that the facility complies with the law. 54 They have also
imposed sewer moratoria. 55 These are orders prohibiting the hook-up of new
sewerage connections to sewage treatment plants that violate water pollution
control laws. Such orders have a nice rationality: if a plant cannot adequately
treat the sewage it is receiving, it should not be allowed to receive additional
sewage. The orders also have an important political dimension in that they
mobilize building contractors to pressure the plant to comply with the law.
Courts have also ordered companies that violated reporting requirements
under environmental laws to conduct audits at their facilities. 56 Given an
appropriate request from the enforcing agency and a flexible judge, the
possibilities are virtually unlimited. 57
51 Clean Air Act 113(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b) (West 1995).
52 Clean Water Act §§ 309(b), (d), (0, 402(h), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1319(b), (d), (I), 1342(h)(West
1986 & Supp. 1997).
53 E.g., United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (B.D. Mich. 1979) (appointing

mayor of city as "administrator," but specifically granting him the powers of a receiver).
54 E.g., People v. SanitaryDist. of Decatur, No. 82w3375 (C.D.1I1. Dec. 29, 1982); described

in M. Gelpe, Pollution Control /.AJws Against Public Facilities, I3 Harv. Envt!. L. Rev.
69, 127 (1989).
55 E.g., United States v. Douglas County,S Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (D. Nev. May 16,

1973). See generally Gelpe, supra note 54, at 119-20,
56 The cases, which arose under the Toxic Substances Control Act, are discussed in 3
Rodgers, supra note 31, § 6.lO (1988), This could lead to detection and remediation or
prosecution of additional violations,
57 See the cases under the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, which are discussed in
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In some cases, the authority of American courts to issue such creative
types of orders derives from general statutory authorization. For example,
the Clean Water Act explicitly authorizes courts to provide "appropriate
relief. "58 But such explicit authorization may not be necessary; even without
it, federal courts have considerable discretion in shaping injunctive
remedies. 59
Israeli laws do not explicitly provide comparable authority. The closest
thing is the authority courts have under a few laws to issue orders to violators
to comply with the requirements of the laws, to prevent future violations, or
to clean up pollution caused by a violation and to restore the area to its
pre-violation condition. 60 Such powers differ from the broad authority
found in American law in many important respects. To begin with, not all
Israeli laws provide such authority. Those that do generally authorize issuance of only a limited range of types of orders, and sometimes the orders
have only a very limited duration. Most importantly, Israeli courts are
authorized to provide such relief only against a person who has been
convicted of a criminal violation and only in the context of criminal proceedings. In some cases, the courts have authority to issue such a "civil" type of
order only for the period between indictment for acrime and decision on the
criminal charge. 6 !

58
59

60

61

4 Rodgers, supra note 31. Stipulated penalties are another type of special feature that
may be included in COUft orders. Discussion of such penalties, which are similar to
liquidated damages in contracts, is beyond the scope ofthis paper. See Gelpe, supra note
54, at 108-15.
Clean Water Act § 309(b).
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). Congress could, alieast to
some extent, explicitly limit that authority.
E.g., Water Law § 20X (1959), I993Isr. Envt!. Legis. D-2, D-13 (order to pay clean-up
costs incurred by any person, to do what is needed to stop the pollution, to clean up the
water, and to restore the condition that existed before the violation). The statute that
applies to air, odor, and noise pollution used to provide the authority for courts to issue
orders "to refrain from any act which caused the offence of which [the person] has been
convicted." Abatement of Nuisances Law § 11(b). This statute was recently amended,
and such authority was deleted; Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment]
[Amendment of Statutes] § 3(9).
E.g., Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § 14a. This provision was added by a recent
amendment (Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of
Statutes] § 2[8]). The Water Law has an unusual provision authorizing the court to issue
an order to prevent, cease, or reduce pollution to someone who is merely suspected or
accused of committing an offense under the law; Water Law § 20W(a). Such orders could
be a potent tool, but they are severely limited in duration. In the case of someone who has
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Several of the Israeli statutes provide for a different type of judicial relief.
Courts may order a person convicted of violating an environmental law to
compensate anyone who cleaned up the pollution for the costs he incurred.62
b) Evaluation - Efficacy
Civil orders are designed mainly as specific deterrents; that is, they are
aimed at bringing a violating facility into compliance. Even as such, there is a
question as to whether they actually accomplish this goal. What good does it
do to have a court order a facility to do what the law already requires the
facility to do? If a facility has already shown that it will violate the law, what
is there to suggest that it will now obey a court order?
OQ.e answer is that an order by a court carries extra weight, because the
honor of the court and the remedy of contempt stand behind the order. A
second answer is that facilities pay more attention to court orders because
they are specific rather than general. The order of a court is directed at a
specific party, whereas the requirements of the law are directed at all sources.
Yet another answer proposes that civil orders work mainly in cases where

some special remedy is ordered, such as a receivership or a sewer moratorium.
These are remedies that go beyond the prima facie requirements of the law.
Civil orders should not be expected to have much value in general deterrence. After all, they basically require the violator to do what was required of
him to begin with. If not accompanied by some extra "pain," they provide no
motivation for sources not to ignore the requirements ofthe law and to wait
until they are caught. "Pain" can be inflicted by publicity, but whether this is
effective depends on the attitude of the particular society toward environmental violations. At present, American polluters are probably more sensitive to adverse publicity regarding environmental problems than their Israeli
counterparts.
Only in their more creative form are civil orders weJl-suited for purposes
other than specific deterrence. For example, a civil order to publicize viola-

not been formally indicted for an offense, the maximum duration of the order is only

seven days; thus, this is not a useful tool for stemming pollution over the course of the
type of lengthy investigation that may be required. Water Law § 20W(c). Not all laws
grantsuch authority to issue civil-type orders. For anexample of a law that does provide
such authority, see Prevention of Sea Pollution from Land~Based Sources Law.
62 E.g., Abatement of Nuisances Law § lOa(c) (as added by Environmental Quality Law
[Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] § 3[8]); Dangerous Substances Law
§ 15a(c).
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tions may work as a general deterrent. Orders may also require clean-up and
restoration of polluted areas.
c) Workability
It is easier for an American administrative authority to get a civil order
than it is for an Israeli authority to obtain a civil-type remedy, since the
Israeli authority must bring a criminal, rather than civil, proceeding. The
costs of civil litigation still present a significant barrier, of course, but it is not
as high a barrier as is posed by the special procedural and other requirements
of criminal proceedings.
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness
Civil court orders raise no fairness problems for defendants against whom
the law is being enforced. With regard to substantive fairness, a defendant
can raise no reasonable objection that the remedy is disproportionately
harsh, even in the context of the creative remedies ordered by American
courts, as long as the requirements in the court order are closely connected to
those imposed in the underlying laws. As for procedural fairness, since the
remedy is civil, the protections offered by the civil proceeding in court are
sufficient.
There is, however, some cause for concern regarding substantive and
procedural fairness to third parties connected to some of the creative remedies
ordered by American courts. In cases such as sewer moratoria, the court
order may affect such third parties as building contractors and property
buyers who are not represented in the litigation between the government and
the violating facility. Courts should allow representatives of affected third
parties to participate in the formulation of the remedy in order to protect
their legitimate interests. It should be recalled, however, that insofar as what
such third parties want (such as unrestricted development) will cause violations of pollution control laws, their interests do not warrant strong legal
protection.

4. Civil Penalties
a) Description
Many American statutes provide for enforcement through court-imposed
civil penalties. 63 These penalties are imposed by courts at the request of the
63 E.g., Clean Air Act § I 13(b); Clean Water Act § 309(d); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a), (g) (West 1995).
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government, are paid into the treasury, and are denominated by the statutes
as civil rather than criminal in nature. The amounts of the penalties may be
substantial - up to $25,000 per day per violation." Courts have imposed
total civil penalties in the millions of dollars," although smaller assessments
are typical and substantial portions of the large penalty assessments are
sometimes later forgiven. 66
The fact that these penalties are denominated as "civil" suggests that they
are not designed to be punitive. Yet some facets of the authorizing statutes
and of the case law suggest otherwise. The Clean Water Act provides that in
"determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the
seriousness ofthe violation ... , any history of such violations, any good-faith
efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, ... and such other
matters as justice may require. "6' These factors resemble those that are
typically considered when determining whether a defendant is deserving of
punishment through a criminal sanction. In addition, the case law indicates
that for some purposes, the civil penalties are to be considered pena1. 68 No
doubt, at least when the penalties are large, they do have a retributive
character.
Other features of the penalties are clearly civil in nature. For example, the
economic benefit secured by the violator is relevant in fixing the penalty
amount, which should work to recapture that benefit." Moreover, labels do
matter." The stigma attached to criminal convictions probably does not
attach to these civil assessments.'!
No comparable enforcement method is found in the Israeli laws.
64 E.g., Clean Air Act § 113(b); Clean Water Act § 309(d). Some penalties under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are limited to $25,000 per violation. 42
U.S.C.A. § 6928(g) (West 1995).
65 E.g., United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 770 (W.O. Tex. 1985) ($4.5

million).
66 Gelpe, supra note 54, at 89-92.
67 Clean Water Act § 309(d).

68 E.g., United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (holding that civil
penalties are punitive for purposes of determining whether they survive the death of the
violator).
69 Clean Water Act § 309(d).
70 See M. eheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal LAw
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal Civil Law Distinction, 42
Hastings L..!. 1325 (1991).
71 In fact, it has been suggested that one of the main advantages of such penalties is that they
preserve the special quality of criminal sanction for serious transgressions involving
culpable conduct. [d., at 1346.
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b) Evaluation - Efficacy
While these penalties may have some retributive effect, their principal
value is in their role as general deterrents. 72 Large penalties create headlines,
which can be assumed to have a deterrent effect. Even small penalties, if
applied to a great many sources, send a clear message that the law must be
obeyed."
Civil penalties are also effective for achieving the economic goal of enforcement: recapturing savings from non-compliance. For example, the
Clean Water Act provides explicitly that a court should consider "the
economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation" in setting the penalty.74
The purpose of this provision - to prevent violators from obtaining an
economic advantage over their competitors 75 - can be attained if penalties
are imposed on a consistent basis.
Other factors considered in determining penalty amounts under American
law include the ability of the violator to pay and the seriousness of the
violation.'6 The relevance of such factors may be fairly debated. It has been
argued that both fairness and effective deterrence require consideration of
ability to pay.77 On the other hand, if the main element of the penalty is
recapture of savings, ability to pay should be irrelevant. Compliance would
have required the expenditures in the first place, regardless of ability to pay.
Therefore, ability to pay should be considered only in determining how
much higher than the economic savings should the penalty be set, and in
setting a payment schedule. For sources in strong economic condition, the
ability-to-pay factor requires setting the penalty high in order for it to be an
effective specific and general deterrent. For sources with more limited
means, the ability-to-pay factor may mean adding a smaller extra amount
beyond the economic savings or providing for payment over a longer period.
For such sources, deterrence will work without a large penalty amount.
The relevance of the seriousness of the violation in setting penalty amounts
is also questionable. If this is a surrogate for determining the degree of
72 Cj. Cheh, supra note 70, at 1347-48 (the civil remedy of forfeiture encourages those
dealing with transgressors to monitor their behavior to avoid impacts of the forfeitures).

73 On the findings as to consistent use"of small civil penalties in the state of Wisconsin, see
Gelpe, supra note 54, at 88-90.
74 Clean Water Act § 309(d). See alsa Clean Air Act § II3(e).
75 See 2 Rodgers, supra note 31, § 4.2A (Supp. 1992).
76 See Clean Air Act § 113(e).
77 Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 388,
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environmental harm, it is an acceptable consideration. It is also acceptable
as a consideration in determining whether the cost to the government of an
enforcement action is justified at all. But if seriousness is used to measure
deservedness of punishment, it is of questionable relevance in a civil proceeding. It is preferable to keep the civil nature of the penalty clear by basing the
penalty amounts on savings recapture plus an additional sum sufficient to
deter.
Because civil penalties are paid into the general treasury, they are not
useful for clean-up and restoration of areas affected by pollution. Still, the
mere existence of civil penalties in fact often leads to clean-up and restoration
activities. Suits for civil penalties tend to be settled between the parties,"
because under American law, liability is clear and the penalty amounts are
high. It is not unusual to find, as part of a settlement, an agreement by the
alleged violator to fund clean-up and restoration work. Although this practice has stirred some debate," it has been recognized in the Clean Air Act.
Since 1990, this Act has authorized courts to order that up to $100,000 of an
assessed civil penalty be used for clean-up, restoration, or other "beneficial
mitigation projects" that serve the purposes of the Act and "enhance the
public health or the environment. ''80 This authorization is limited, however,
to enforcement actions brought by citizens and does not extend to enforcement actions brought by government authorities.
As in the context of criminal fines, courts must be careful with allowing
forgiveness of civil penalties for sources that later come into compliance with
the law. Forgiveness can provide a good motivation for a source to comply,
but sources are supposed to comply with the law without this added motivation. If a penalty is completely or almost completely forgiven, all value for
general deterrence is lost. Violators must always be required to pay the full
economic savings from their earlier non-compliance. The mere fact that they
came into compliance late will almost always entail a savings in that the
source had use of the funds not expended on timely compliance. In addition,
there must always be some penalty for violation in order to give an economic
advantage to those sources that have complied voluntarily.

78 1 Rodgers, supra note 31, at 539.
79 See M. Gelpe & 1.L. Barnes, Penalties in Settlements of Citizen Suit Enforcement
Actions Under the Clean Water Act, 16 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1025 (1990).
80 Clean Air Act § 304(g)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(g)(2) (West 1995).
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c) Workability
It is easier for enforcing agencies to obtain civil penalties than criminal
penalties, for the same reason that it is easier to obtain civil enforcement
orders. The criminal law system can be avoided.
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness
The main difficulties with civil penalties arise in this area. Since the
penalties are imposed in civil proceedings, there is a question as to whether
the procedures used are sufficient to guarantee a fair proportionality between
the penalty and the violation and as to whether further procedural protections are due the alleged violator by virtue of the quasi-punitive nature of the
penaltiesY
To the extent that the penalties are based on recovering economic gain,
they are civil in nature and require no further procedures than those usually
available in a civil trial. More troublesome is the issue of procedural fairness
in relation to the punitive aspect of the penalties. American courts have
largely overlooked this issue in the environmental context, finding that a
penalty denominated by the legislature as civil is indeed civil and no criminal
procedural rights attach. s, Some dissenting voices have been heard in the
case law and, to an even greater extent, it the literature. The literature
generally addresses broader issues of civil-type remedies under many different
types of statutes and suggests that some of these remedies are sufficiently
punitive in nature to require that at least some of the procedural guarantees
of criminal proceedings be provided. B3
Some commentators suggest jettisoning the distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings as determinative of the procedures due a defendant
and finding an intermediate ground for the types of special enforcement
actions found in modern regulatory statutes. 84 Specifically, it has been
suggested that in the United States, the necessary procedural guarantees
could be decided on a case-by-case basis, using the procedural due process

81 See Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 370-74; Mann, supra note 1, at 260-61.
82 E.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.s.. 412 (1987), For a discussion of eases not limited to

the environmental area, see Mann, supra note I, at 254-55.
83 See Mann, supra note I, at 254-55; Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 397 -419. In the

United States, even if the penalties are considered to be civil in nature, procedural issues
arise regarding the right to trial by jury. These were settled in Tull. 481 U.S. at 412.
84 See Mann, supra note 1.
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test set out by the Supreme Court." The problem with this proposal is that it
requires case-by-case determination of rights due a defendant. Until the
case law decides enough cases under enough statutes, the uncertainty will be
high, as will the cost of litigating to settle that uncertainty.
Israeli law already provides a perhaps more viable, alternative solution to
this problem. As under the laws for small criminal penalties, the defendant
could be offered the option of a criminal adjudication. An agency could file a
civil complaint against an alleged violator, asking for court-imposed civil
penalties in a stated amount. The defendant would then have the option of
requesting a criminal proceeding in which he would be subject to any
criminal penalty provided by law and also to the opprobrium that a possible
criminal conviction would carry.
5. Administrative Compliance Orders
a) Description
Under most environmental statutes in both Israel and the United States,
the administrative agency charged with implementing the statute may order
a violating facility to comply with the requirements of the law. 86 Under some
statutes, the agency is granted general authority to issue an order." Other
statutes delineate more specifically the types of requirements that may be
imposed in an order." Usually the agency is given a free hand in issuing such
orders; a few statutes impose specific procedural requirements, although
even these tend to be minimal. 89
Administrative orders differ from civil compliance orders issued by courts
in that the former do not carry the weight of a judicial determination. This
may affect the willingness of a violator to comply with the order. Under
American law, while a civil court order may be enforced by relatively
85 This suggestion is advanced by Cheh, supra note 70, at 1394, The Supreme Court case
that Cheh refers to is Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
86 Examples from Israeli law include Abatement of Nuisances Law § 8(a), 15 L.S.I. 52, 53
(1960-1961); Water Law § 20G. 20H (1959),1993 Isf. Envt!. Legis. D-2, D-8, D-9. These
orders may be called "orders," "instructions," or "notices." The term used is of no legal
importance. In American law, examples are found in the Clean Air Act § 113(a)(I),
(3)(B); and the Clean Water Act § 309(a)(3).

87 E,g., Abatement of Nuisances Law § 8; Clean Air Act § 113(a)(I).
88 E.g., Water Law § 20H.
89 The Clean Air Act requires that the person to whom certain orders are issued have "an
opportunity to confer with the Administrator concerning the alleged violation." §
113(a)(4).
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abbreviated contempt proceedings, an administrative order may be enforced
only by a full civil or criminal proceeding. 9o Still, a court proceeding for
enforcing an administrative order may be abbreviated if the court gives great
deference to the administrative determination in formulating the order.
b) Evaluation - Efficacy
Administrative orders are useful as specific deterrents, but only in a
limited class of cases. Where a violator does not realize that the law applies
to him or does not believe that the agency is serious about requiring compliance with the law, the order may deliver a needed message. Moreover, if a
source does not understand which specific steps it must take to comply with
the law, the order may be helpful in spelling out those steps. The order may
also be helpful if there is judicial enforcement against the violator at a later
point; a specific order eliminates the defense that the violator did not know
either that the law applied to him or what action was required for complying
with the law. While neither of these "defenses" may be cognizable strictly
according to the law, they do have the potential to sway judges into giving a
violator a second chance. In effect, the order becomes the first chance,
making the judicial proceeding the second chance.
However, use of orders may counteract the general deterrent effect of
statutes and regulations. If violators realize that the enforcing agency will
always resort first to orders before turning to more serious enforcement
methods, they may see no reason to engage in costly compliance activities
before an order is issued. Issuing orders, rather than resorting to stronger
enforcement methods, may only delay compliance. Furthermore, because
administrative orders in themselves carry no clear, specific sanction, a
facility that ignored the legal requirements of the law in the first place may
pay no more attention to the administrative order. 9i

90 Court orders can be enforced by civil contempt. In contempt proceedings, the only issues
that a court considers are whether the order was violated and, as a defense, whether
compliance was possible. United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D. N.J. 1987).
Infeasibility of compliance may be a defense, unless the court considers closing the
facility as a possible means of compliance. In Commonwealth Dep't ofEnvtl. Resources
v, Pennsylvania Power Co., 461 Pa. 675, 337 A.2d 823 (1975), the court recognized
infeasibility of compliance as a defense without considering whether the facility could
have complied by closing.
91 A study of enforcement actions against public facilities identified this problem. Gelpe,
supra note 54, at 102.

ENFORCEMENT GOALS & METHODS

161

c) Workability
Administrative orders are, in theory, relatively easy to issue procedurally,
so they would be expected to have a high degree of workability. This ease,
however, is at times illusory. In Israel, especially, issuance of such orders
may be quite politicized, so the administrative authority may find it quite
difficult in practice to issue such an order. 92 In addition, it may be difficult
for the agency to draw up specific schedules to include in the order. Sometimes this requires intimate knowledge of the processes operated by the
facility, of production schedules, etc., and such information is not likely to
be available within the agency and may be difficult to acquire. If a specific
schedule is not realistic, it will encourage resistance rather than compliance.
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness
Administrative orders, since they are not self-enforcing, do not raise
problems of procedural fairness, even if they are not issued through formal
proceedings. An alleged violator who objects to an order can seek immediate
judicial review, or he can challenge the legality of the orderin a defense to an
enforcement proceeding." The procedures can be supplied by the courts on
judicial review.
Enforcing authorities should, however, extend certain procedural rights
to those against whom the orders are issued for two reasons. First, substantive fairness demands it because the agency is more likely to make mistakes
in its requirements, asking for more expensive than necessary compliance
techniques or imposing unrealistic requirements, if it does not first consult
with the pollution source. Second, good procedure can protect the order if it
is later reviewed by a court, either in an administrative action to enforce the
order or on direct judicial review of the order. A court would be expected to
give a greater degree of deference to the authority's formulation of requirements in the order if the source were given some voice in its formulation.
92 Issuance of administrative orders regarding air pollution from the refinery and power
station in the Haifa bay area went through many stages and involved several governmental

and academic committees.
93 In the United States, courts generally do not allow immediate judicial review of orders

under the doctrine of ripeness requiring sources to wait until an agency tries to enforce
the order. E.g., Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990);
Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989). In Israel, immediate judicial
review is theoretical,ly available in a petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High
Court of Justice, although the Court does not always agree to consider such petitions on
their merits.

162

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LAW

This is not to suggest that full trial-type procedures must be provided.
Rather, the alleged violator should be informed of the information in the
hands of the agency and should be given notice of, and a chance to react to,
the proposed order. To maintain workability, reasonably tight time limitations should be maintained in these procedures.
6. Administrative Corrective Actions
a) Description
A provision common to many Israeli environmental laws, but rare in the
American laws, allows the authority responsible for administering a statute
to step in and cure a violation by itself and then to collect the costs of its
actions from the violator. 94 First, the authority must order the source
responsible for the violation to remedy it; the authority can step in only if the
actions required by the order are not executed. In the United States, similar
authority is found in the Superfund Law for clean-up of contamination at
hazardous waste disposal sites," and much more limited authority, relating
only to extreme emergencies, is provided for in other statutes. 96
b) Evaluation - Efficacy
Administrative corrective actions, if they are used, can have general
deterrent value. Facilities that are concerned that government will "botch"
the job and try to charge them with unnecessary costs have an incentive to
prevent violations that are serious enough for the administrative authority
to invoke this enforcement method.
These actions also recapture at least some of the economic gain of a
violation, since they force the violator to pay for the cure. The cost of the
cure can even exceed the economic gain from the violation.
c) Workability
This remedy is not highly workable for administrative agencies that lack
the expertise, manpower, or funding to undertake the clean-up. Even if an
94 E.g., Water Law § 20G(b) (disposal of junk cars); Maintenance of Cleanliness Law §
13(b) (disposal of waste or construction waste into a public area or littering a public area);
Abatement of Nuisances Law § llA, 15 L.S.!. 52, 54 (I 960-1961)(relating to stopping
operation of a car alarm which is causing noise pollution); Abatement of Nuisances Law
§ lIb (all causes of air, noise, and odor pollution).
95 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U,S.C.A.
§§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (West 1995).
96 Clean Air Act § 303, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (West 1995).
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agency uses contractors to do the work, oversight is necessary. Moreover,
the prospect of recovering clean-up costs does not eliminate the need for
funds for the initial outlay. In the United States, the government finances the
clean-up from a special superfund, but even these funds have not proven to
be sufficient, and the government works hard to get the responsible parties
to do the clean-up without initial government funding. In Israel, the monies
available from special funds under some of the laws can, in theory, be used,
but again the adequacy of the funds is likely to be a problem.
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness

The use of administrative corrective actions carries a risk of substantive
unfairness. The government agency may, indeed, spend excessive amounts
of money on its actions. A source's claim that charging it such excessive
expenditures is unfair is mitigated if the source responsible for the pollution
has received prior notice that action is needed and has had the opportunity
to do the work itself or if an emergency exists. Procedural fairness claims can
be alleviated by providing the source with procedural rights at the collection
stage, although to the extent that collection becomes more cumbersome, this
remedy is less useful for administering agencies.
7. Withholding Administrative Benefits
a) Description
Sometimes violating facilities need something from the enforcing agency.
They may need benefits associated with the violating facility, such as renewal
of its operating permit, or benefits associated not with that specific facility
but with other operations of the same company. Thus, one method of
enforcement is for the regulating agency to deny such permits or other benefits
to the violator.
Several American statutes prohibit the federal government from entering
into a contract on any matter with a person convicted of criminal violation
of the statute." Other provisions prohibit granting a construction or operating permit for a facility if the owner or operator has another facility that is
violating applicable emission limitations" or impose other limitations on

97 Clean Air Act § 306, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7606 (West 1995); Clean Water Act § 508, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1368 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
98 Clean Air Act § 173(a)(3), 42 U.S.CA. § 7503(a)(3)(West 1995). This prohibition applies

in areas that are already polluted according to the statute's standards.
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federal provision of financial assistance, contracts, or permits to violating
activities. 99

Israeli law also provides for withholding administrative benefits from
those who violate environmental laws. A planning commission, when requested to approve expansion of a facility, can require that equipment in the
existing facility be upgraded for pollution prevention. 100 Presumably, the
commission also can require other steps toward the same goal. Under
Israel's law on oil pollution of the seas, the Port Master can prevent a ship
from leaving port if a fine regarding that ship has not been paid. 101
b) Evaluation- Efficacy
This remedy is likely to work as both a specific and general deterrent, but
only with regard to those facilities in need of a government benefit. In cases
where a facility requires a permit that must be renewed periodically, this
remedy can work quite well.lfpermit renewal is conditioned on compliance,
the authority could refuse to renew the permit for any violating facility. In
the United States, such permitting schemes are the norm. In Israel, permits
are not required under most of the environmental statutes, so this remedy is
less effective. 102 I! can be of use only if a facility wants to undertake the kind
of expansion that requires planning approval.
c) Workability
This remedy is easy to use if the proper legal framework is in place. The
agency need only wait for the facility to seek the benefit and then ask that the
facility demonstrate compliance. If the facility does not need a permit Or the
99 E.g., Clean Air Act §§ 176,306,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7506, 7606 (West 1995). Federal rules
provide for suspension and debarment of a firm as government contractors if that firm
has been found to have performed poorly on a public contract or to have demonstrated a
lack of business integrity or competency. A federal official engaged in enforcing these
regulations reports that they may be applied for environmental violations. Sims, Suspen~
sion and Debarment: Potent Government Too/s, 25 Sanreel News No.4, I (Jan./Feb.
1994).
100 R. Laster, Israel, in International Encyclopaedia of Laws, Supp. 5 Environmental Law at
Israel-33 (R. Bianpain ed., 1993).
10 I Prevention of SeaM Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 28 (1980), 1993 Isr.
Envtl. Legis. E-2, E-7.
102 In the United States, both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act require permits for
all discharges. Permits generally must be renewed every five years. Clean Air Act §§
502(b)(5)(B), 503(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7661a(b)(5)(B), 7661b(a) (West 1995); Clean Water
Act § 402(a), (b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a), (b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
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benefit is provided by some other agency or authority, workability is more of
a problem. In the latter case, good communication between different governmental authorities is necessary for the remedy to work.
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness
Substantive fairness is a problem if the violation is minor and the effect of
withholding the permit is substantial. Such dis proportionality will rarely
arise since most minor violations can be corrected at little cost.
Procedural fairness is more troublesome. The agency determination that a
violation exists must be made in a trustworthy manner; otherwise, the power
wielded by an agency over a facility in need of a permit or other benefit may
be too great. On the other hand, if extensive formal procedures are required,
workability is lost.

8. Administrative Penalties
a) Description
Several American statutes authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to impose administrative penalties. These penalties are civil, not criminal,
in nature. They are not self-enforcing; that is, the agency has no authority to
collect the penalty without the assistance of a court. In a civil proceeding to
collect the penalty, the court may review the propriety of the administrative
decision to impose the penalty and the penalty amount; however, this review
may be limited in scope. General principles of administrative law require
that the court defer to the administrative decision. In addition, some environmental statutes explicitly dictate that courts defer to the agency decision
in fixing the penalty or allow judicial review only within a short time-frame. 103
On the other hand, the agency must use a complicated, trial-type procedure
in assessing the penalty under such statutes.
The EPA has power to assess administrative penalties under most of its
major statutory authorizations.lOl One provision of the Clean Air Act

I"

103 FO>" example, the Clean Air Acl § 113(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(r) (West 1995),
provides that on review, an order should be set aside only jfnot supported by substantial
evidence in the record or ifit is an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the person to whom
the administrative order is issued may seek judicial review within thirty days of its
issuance. Thereafter, it may not be reviewed by any court, including an action to enforce

the order.
104 E.g., Clean Air Act § 113(d)(2J.
105 Clean Air Act §§ 120, 205(c), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7120, 7524 (Wesl 1995); Clean Waler Acl §
309(g), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
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includes explicit instructions on how to set the amount of the penalty in
order to assure recapture of economic benefits from non-compliance;!06
other statutory provisions provide more wide-ranging and general instructions for considering not only economic benefit but also such factors as the
gravity of the violation, compliance history, and the violator's ability to pay
the penalty.!07 Other provisions offer even less guidance on how to fix the
penalty amount. lOS Some statutes specify use of formal proceedings in
setting penalties,109 while others authorize informal proceedings. 110
Israeli small criminal fines, discussed above, are comparable to the American administrative penalties in that they may be imposed without the
involvement of a court, and an administrative agency determines the amount
of the fine. They differ from the American administrative penalties in that
the Legal Advisor to the Government, and not the agency charged with
implementing the law, may impose the fine. More importantly, these fines
are not really administrative fines in that they bear the stigma and any other
implications of a determination of criminal guilt. A person who has paid
such a fine is seen to have admitted his guilt before a court, to have been
judged guilty, and to have fulfilled his punishment.
Recent amendments to the Israeli laws on corrective action include provisions that resemble administrative penalties, but only within a very limited
context and with the amount of the penalty strictly controlled. These laws
provide that if an authority issues a corrective action order and the responsi-

and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA], 7 U.S. CA. § 1361(a)(West 1980&Supp. 1997); Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S,c'A. § 1415(a) (West 1986 & West
Supp. 1997); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(c) (West
1995); Toxic Substances Control Act, IS U.S.C.A. § 2619 (West 1982 & West Supp.
1997). In addition, the environmental agencies in some states hold such authority, and
others have expressed an interest in acquiring authority to impose administrative penalties. Gelpe, supra note 54, at 84.

106 Clean Air Act § 120(d).
107 Clean Air Act § 20S(c)(2); Clean Water Act § 309(g).
108 The following acts list fewer factors to be considered in setting penalties: Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26IS(a)(2)(B) (West 1982 & West Supp. 1997); FIFRA, 7
U.S.C.A. § 136ka)(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1997); Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act contains no listing of
factors for consideration.
109 E.g., IS U.S.C.A. § 26IS(a)(2)(A).
110 Clean Water Act § 309(g)(2)(A) (for penalties not greater than $25,000); Clean Air Act §
120 (for penalties based on statutorily delineated and relatively technical calculations).
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ble party does not do as ordered, he can be required to pay twice the amount
that the authority paid to take the corrective action req\lested. 11I
One Israeli law does authorize true administrative penalties, but it has
only very limited potential application to environmental enforcement and
has not, in fact, been used at all in this area. The Administrative Offenses
Law l12 authorizes various ministers to establish by regulations that violations
of specified laws are administrative violations, and to impose administrative
penalties. The only environmental law covered by the Law is the Public
Health Ordinance, 113 which, as its name indicates, deals mainly with health
issues proper and only incidentally with environmental regulations. Furthermore, the ministers involved have never used their authority to enact

regulations that make violations of the Public Health Ordinance subject to
administrative penalties.
b) Evaluation - Efficacy
These penalties are similar to civil penalties in terms of how effectively
they achieve the goals of enforcement.
c) Workability
These penalties are somewhat easier for agencies to impose than are civil
penalties, because the enforcing authorities do not have to turn to the courts.
This ease is partially offset by the procedures required to the extent that
formal administrative hearings are used and also by the need for a court
hearing in order to force payment from a recalcitrant source. Consistent

with this point, one report suggests that the EP A use its authority to impose
administrative penalties more frequently under statutes providing flexible
administrative procedures and less frequently under those requiring the
agency to use trial-type procedures and to make highly technical findings
relating to the penalty amount. I I'
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness
Administrative penalties are substantively unfair if they are disproportional to the violation. To the extent that the statutes provide specific
III
112
113
1I4

E.g., Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § 13(a)(2).
1986 S.H. 1160 (1985).
!d., app.
T, Schoenbaum & R. Rosenberg, Environmental Policy Law: Problems, Cases, and
Readings 767-70, 1028 (2d ed. 1991).
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considerations that must form the basis for the penalty amounts and to the
extent that these considerations are directed at recapture of economic savings, the problem of disproportion is reduced.
Procedural fairness can be ensured through trial-type proceedings before
the agency or via judicial review of the penalty, either through direct judicial
review or through review when the agency goes to court to collect the
penalty. To the extent that the court defers to the agency decision, the
procedural rights (>fthe source are less protected. Again, this is less troublesome when the penalty amount is based on fairly technical economic factors.
However, to work as effective deterrents, the penalty amounts must be
higher than the economic savings of the non-complying source, and consequently, the amounts must sometimes be very large.
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
Both Israeli and U.S. environmental laws provide several different methods of enforcement. This allows the regulator to suit the enforcement
method to the needs of a specific case. It is important that regulators be
allowed such flexibility, and it is, therefore, also important that they have at
their disposal a range of enforcement tools. If anything, the range of enforcement alternatives should be expanded for enforcement ofthose statutes
that provide only limited enforcement options. The following recommendations, addressed mainly to changing Israeli law, include suggestions on how
this range should be expanded.
If the regulator is to have so many choices, it is imperative that the
regulator understand in which circumstances each method is best. The
recommendations below also address the best application of each recommended method of enforcement.
1. Major Criminal Penalties
While the environmental laws should provide criminal penalties for violations, the criminal sanction should not be relied upon as a major enforcement
method. Such penalties are most appropriate for cases involving real endangerment of public health or welfare. Criminal penalties are also appropriate
for general deterrence where the likelihood of Obtaining criminal prosecutions and convictions is high. This is the case when there is widespread
agreement on the seriousness ofthe violation. Non-reporting cases are thus
regarded in the United States, because the American environmental law
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system relies heavily on self-reporting. Israel. however, does not currently
have as extensive a self-reporting regime.
There are those who may support use of criminal penalties because of the
stigma that these penalties attach to violations. They give environmental
violations a certain "status." But paper "status" unsupported by actual
convictions is more likely to encourage disrespect for the law than recognition
of the importance of compliance.
2. Small Criminal and Administrative Penalties
The current Israeli system in regard to such penalties should be retained,
but with two changes. First, those statutes that impart a "criminal" character
to such penalties should be changed. The penalties should simply be administrative. Second, the penalties system should be made applicable to all the
environmental statutes. Recent amendments to the Israeli laws have partially
accomplished this second task.
The use of small administrative penalties for specific deterrence through
education is a good idea. Similarly, these fines may achieve some general
deterrence. Neither of these objectives requires use of a criminal sanction.
There is no need to provide extensive procedural rights for imposition of
these fines, since they involve no essential stigma or deprivation offreedom.
Further, small fines involve no sjgnificant deprivation of property. To be
certain that no objections are raised regarding the absence of procedure, the
existing system of allowing violators to opt to be sUbjected to a criminal
procedure should be maintained. When relatively small penalty amounts are
imposed, it can be expected that few violators will choose to exercise the
right to go to trial.
3. Civil Orders
Israeli courts now have authority under some statutes to issue civil-type
injunctions, negative and mandatory, to stop pollution and to clean up
polluted areas, but only within the framework of criminal proceedings.
There is no reason to tie this authority to a criminal proceeding; if there is a
need for court orders in such matters, they should be available,even against
polluters who are not subjected to criminal proceedings. Furthermore, there
is no need to provide criminal-type protections to the defendant when a
court is ordering the type of relief it might, in any case, order in a civil
proceeding brought by a private party.
The more difficult question is whether giving courts civil order authority
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would add a remedy of significant importance to the already-available
authority of the administrative agencies to issue compliance orders. Civil
orders issued by a court are effective if a court can add another dimension to
the order that is not provided in an administrative order. A court order adds
a certain measure of prestige and, therefore, urgency to the order. Court
prestige may be particularly important in Israel, where the Ministry of the
Environment still lacks political clout and the Ministry and the local authorities are still working to establish a strong record of administrative enforcement. In addition, an agency that turns to the courts to enforce the law may
free itself of the almost interminable political debates that sometimes accompany formulation of administrative orders in Israel. Finally, court
orders are useful where creative orders would be helpful. Courts can give
more formalized consideration to the interests of affected third parties.
4. Civil Penalties
The major innovation I would suggest is to provide Israeli courts with
statutory authorization to issue civil penalties. These penalties would be
distinguished from criminal penalties by their civil nature. They would be
larger in amount than the administrative penalties discussed in Recommendation 2 above.
Civil penalties have the potential to become a major enforcement tool. As
compared to criminal fines, they are easier to impose and therefore should be
imposed on a greater number of violators. Civil penalties serve the important
objectives of recapturing benefits obtained from violations and general
deterrence. Administrative authorities should request, and courts should
set, penalty amounts at alevel sufficient to recapture these benefits, and they
should add enough extra penalty for a genuine deterrent effect.
The major problem presented by civil penalties arises in the realm of
procedural fairness. There are several possible solutions to this problem.
One is to provide some of the procedural protections of a criminal trial and
not others. The specific protections could be set out legislatively, but this
would be a difficult task, given the difficulty that would be encountered in
deciding which procedural protections are warranted for all types of cases. A
second solution would be to adopt the American approach, namely, to leave
it to the courts to sort out which procedural protections are needed. But this
is a slow process, sure to take many years, and in the meantime, the validity
of civil penalties in Israel will be uncertain. If the validity is uncertain,
ministries and other authorities will hesitate to seek such penalties for fear of
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wasting resources without securing a positive result, or for fear of making
bad law in hard cases. In addition, courts unsure of the procedural issue will
hesitate to impose substantial penalties. So the real advantage of this potentially important enforcement tool will not be realized for many years.
Moreover, if the courts in Israel, unlike those in the United States, find it
necessary to encumber the granting of civil penalties with heavy procedural
requirements, the utility of this enforcement tool will be diminished.
A third, and preferable, alternative is to use the procedure already established in the Israeli laws for small criminal penalties, namely, to give an
alleged violator the option of having criminal proceedings instead of civil
penalty proceedings brought against him. In this way, the violator will be
guaranteed full procedural rights. While this route will expose the violator to
the risks of opprobrium of a criminal determination, a possibly higher fine,
and to the penalty of imprisonment, the violator can hardly object. The
violator will then receive all the procedural rights granted in a criminal
proceeding, rights that are designed to provide the appropriate degree of
protection against these risks.
One might ask whether this solution will eliminate civil penalties as a
realistic option because alleged violators will always opt for the procedural
protections of a criminal proceeding. This is an empirical question about
expected behavior. There seems to be little basis for assuming that this will,
indeed, be the case, unless the State seeks extremely harsh civil penalties.
Most alleged violators cannot be expected to prefer the stigma of a criminal
adjudication and the risk, however remote, of incarceration.

This solution should have the salntary effect of deterring public enforcement authorities from asking for extremely harsh civil penalties. Mann has
noted that in some cases, imposition of a civil penalty may cause greater
hardship to a violator than would imposition of a criminal penalty, and this
is unjust if the civil penalty is imposed without the procedural protections of
a criminal trial. I 15 The suggested option of the criminal sanction would not
only deter the authority from creating such a situation by seeking a harsh
civil penalty, but would also give the aIJeged violator a voice in determining
which type of penalty is harder to bear. Mann correctly points out that this is
a sUbjective judgment and that this solution gives voice to that subjective
judgment.

115 Mann, supra note 1, at 257-58.

172

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LAW

For this solution to work, one innovation is necessary. At the beginning of
the civil penalty proceeding, the potential liability of the alleged violator
should not be open-ended. The statute or statutes authorizing civil penalties
should set a maximum amount and should specify that in the complaint for a
specific case, the enforcing public authority should ask for a specific penalty.
The court in a civil proceeding should not be permitted to impose a higher
penalty unless it finds good cause in facts not available to the agency at the
time of filing the complaint, or else it finds that the agency request was
unconscionably low. The amount requested by the authority in the civil
proceeding would have no influence on the amount of a potential fine in a
criminal proceeding, should the defendant choose that route.116

5. Administrative Orders
Administrative orders are helpful for achieving three objectives: (I) to get
the attention of a source, particularly a small facility, not familiar with the
requirements imposed by environmental laws; (2) to give a source technical
assistance in determining what it must do to comply with the law; and (3) to
prevent the alleged violator from later claiming, either honestly or disingenuously, in a civil or criminal enforcement action before a court that it did not
know what the law required. To deal with these circumstances, the Israeli
Ministry of the Environment, or other ministries and public authorities
charged with enforcing environmental laws, should have authority to issue
administrative enforcement orders that include orders to cease pollution, to
prevent renewed pollution, and to clean up and restore polluted areas. The
law should state that orders should include specific requirements and timetables. Such detailed authority now exists under some of the environmental
laws, such as the Water Law,ll7 but not under others.
Formulation of complex orders that include specific requirements and
timetables will place a heavier burden on the agencies, but issuance of more
general orders requiring only compliance with the law in broad terms is
116 This rejects the approach found in the current law on oil pollution of the sea, which

prohibits the court in a criminal proceeding from setting a fine lower than that requested
by the agency, unless the accused proves special conditions that justify a lower fine.
Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 27(b).
117 The authority to issue these orders under the Water Law is held by the Water Commissioner and not by the Minister of the Environment. Water Law § 20E, G, H. It would be
preferable to transfer the authority to the Minister, but this is not the subject of the
present analysis.
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likely to accomplish little. In cases where it is only necessary to get the
attention of a small facility, a letter, rather than a formal administrative
order, would be sufficient. Other justifications for administrative orders all
require that they be detailed.
An agency that issues administrative orders can reduce the drain on its
reSOurces and alleviate the problem of its limited information regarding
which steps should be specified in the order by requiring the source of the
pollution to propose the specifics of the order, along with a detailed written
justification for the proposed order. This has proven to be quite successful in
some cases in the United States, where there is an active industry of pollution
control specialists ready to develop such proposed orders as consultants to
violating sources. Although consultants will try to reduce the costs to their
clients, they also are motivated not to devise proposals that are "too soft" on
the violators. The consultants must satisfy the regulatory authorities; if they
do not, the work will have to be redone, the client will be unhappy, and other
sources will not seek their services in the future.
To the greatest extent possible, orders should include multi-step timetables. Failure to meet the requirements of any step of an order should be
deemed a violation of the order. This allows the administering authority to
detect problems early on. For example, if the final requirements of an order
were to come into effect at the end ofthree years and no intermediate steps or
timetable had been specified in the order, then the authority might discover
only at the end of the three-year period that even initial steps toward
compliance had not been taken. Furthermore, the authority would almost
certainly have to wait until the end of the three years to take any action
regarding the non-compliance. With a set timetable specified in the order,
the authority would be more likely to know that the source is not on schedule
in correcting the problem, and it could take legal action against the source
without delay. For the same reason, orders should also include self-reporting
requirements to facilitate tracking compliance.
Administrative orders are also useful if accompanied by either a carrot or
a stick that makes them self-enforcing. Orders issued as conditions attached
to expansion permits or funding grants provide a carrot. The permit or grant
would provide that the document is effective only if the violator first meets
the requirements of an attached administrative order. Orders that specify
civil penalties that the agency will seek for non-compliance have sticks.
There should be a penalty specified for each individual action required by
the order and for each violation of the specified timetable.
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Fairness issues should be handled by giving the affected facility some
voice in the formulation of the order. This can be achieved by providing
prior notice and an opportunity to raise objections either in writing or in an
informal conference.
Administrative agencies should not issue orders such as sewage moratoria
with direct effects on third parties. To preserve the substantive and procedural rights of third parties, only courts should issue such orders.

6. Administrative Corrective Actions
Israeli laws currently authorizing agencies to take the steps needed to stop,
prevent, and clean up pollution should be retained, and such authority
should be added to all the environmental laws. This remedy is, however, of
only limited utility. It is most effective for dealing with emergency situations
and only where some designated source of interim funding is available.
Administrative authorities should always try to provide prior notice and
opportunity to conduct the clean-up and to consult on the work plan to the
alleged source of the pollution.
7. Administrative Penalties
Although the Israeli Ministry of the Environment, or any other authorities
charged with enforcing environmental laws, should be authorized to impose
small administrative penalties, the American model of using large administrative fines should not be adopted. Large administrative penalties are of
limited utility. Most American laws allow their imposition only through
highly formal administrative proceedings, so it is not easy for agencies to
impose the penalties. If ministries and other authorities in Israel are given
the option of going to court for a civil penalty, they will have an alternative
method of collecting penalties that is not much more burdensome than
administrative proceedings. In fact, because administrative penalties are not
self-enforcing, resort to court may be needed in any event. Because of the
differences between the Israeli and American political systems, Israeli government ministries tend to be more politically charged than the American
environmental agencies, and it is questionable as to whether they can use
direct administrative order authority in an efficient and even-handed manner.
Finally, since enough changes in the law have been suggested here, there is
no need to add this, the most dubious and potentially most drastic change.
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8. Consistency among Enforcement Methods
To the greatest extent possible, enforcement provisions for all statutes
should be identical. Not only would this avoid senseless differences between
the statutes, but it also would reduce the possibility of wasting resources in
seeking judicial interpretation of the differences. It would allow reliance on
cases that arose through enforcement actions under one statute as precedents
for cases concerning violations of other statutes. With identical enforcement
provisions, it would be easier for personnel in both the ministries and the
local authorities to learn and understand their enforcement powers, and it
would enable citizens to understand what they may expect of the authorities
that are supposed to protect them from violators. In addition, it would be
easier for sources subject to regulatory requirements under several different
statutes to understand the enforcement sanctions to which they may be
subject. This understanding is essential if the laws are to have a deterrent
effect and also for fairness. "' The changes introduced by a 1997 law are a
positive step in this direction,Il9
To accomplish the goal of identifying enforcement methods, it would be
optimal to enact one law on uniform enforcement of environmental statutes,
rather than separate enforcement provisions appearing in each statute. Such
exceptions and special provisions as are needed could be included in the
specific laws. A second best option is to insert identical enforcement provisions in the various environmental statutes.
9. Special Funds for Penalties
In addition to the changes recommended for Israeli law, I propose one
recommendation for a change in U.S. law. Many Israeli laws provide that
monetary penalties be paid into special funds that can be used for cleaning
up the environment. The closest thing to a similar provision in American law
is found in the Clean Air Act, which allows payment of some civil penalties
assessed under that statute into a special fund to be used to finance "air
compliance and enforcement activities. "120 This provision is much more

118 This may not be a major problem in the American federal laws because the federal
regulator, the Environmental Protection Agency, concerns itself mainly with violations
by large companies. These large companies may have as advisors lawyers who specialize
in one or two of the environmental laws.
119 Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] (Amendment of Statutes].
120 Clean Air Act § 304(g)(I), 42 U.S.c. § 7604(g)(I) (West 1995).
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limited than the Israeli provisions. It applies only to actions under one
statute, and even within the framework of that statute, it applies only to
enforcement actions brought by citizens and not to those brought by the
federal government. Furthermore, it is restrictive in terms of the purposes
for which the funds may be used, for example, not allowing their use for
clean-up. American lawmakers should contemplate more extensive use of
special environmental funds.

